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Toward a theory of international new venture survivability 
 
In this longitudinal study, we explore in-depth how entrepreneurs acquire legitimacy for their new 
ventures in an attempt to internationalise and survive before and after the dot.com bubble. We adopted 
a longitudinal multiple-case study methodology for the purpose of theory building. Five firms were 
selected on the basis of purposeful sampling logic from a homogeneous empirical context: they were 
small, software firms from Scotland that internationalised and struggled for survival between 1999 and 
2001. To explore these companies‟ critical events and episodes, the method of critical incident 
technique was employed. The method of constructing typologies by reduction was employed to 
advance the typology of hype defined as the overall sentiment of the environmental context, within 
which the firm is embedded, about the future. Grounded in data, there emerged a middle-range theory 
of international new venture survivability that postulates that the closer the new venture is to the hype, 
the higher the likelihood of failure. Several implications to the theory of new venture legitimacy could 
be singled out. The paper makes an attempt to understand the nature of a legitimacy threshold. The 
data in the study points to the continuous nature of the legitimacy threshold and suggest that it may be 
defined by the time when the emergent industry moves away from hype towards risk decision making 
settings. A set of propositions is put forward to stimulate future research in the area of new venture 
legitimacy.  
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1. Introduction 
In the period from the mid-1990s to 2000 a widespread belief was emerging that the world 
was in the grips of an e-business revolution (Coltman et al., 2001).
 
The future prospects, 
sometimes even exaggerated, of a technology, an innovation, a market, or a product gave birth 
to several myths regarding the new economy. Visionary predictions of the e-business, like 
brands will die, prices will fall, and middlemen will die were driving the valuation of virtual 
firms to the level of the dot.com bubble (Coltman et al., 2001) that burst in 2000. Just because 
an idea is oversold does not mean there is not a grain of truth in it. The OECD (2001) report 
concluded that the information and communication technology have the potential to 
contribute to more rapid growth and productivity gains in OECD economies in the years to 
come. Moreover, it regards „the information and communication technology as transforming 
economic activity, as the steam engine, railways and electricity‟ OECD (2001, p. 27).  
 
In this context, small high-technology firms are seen as engines of economic growth, trying to 
derive their profits from international activities right from their inception (Oviatt and 
McDougall, 2005). At the same time, these international high-growth high-technology 
ventures resemble the firms that venture capitalists will usually back because of the potential 
for very high gains in combination with the availability of early exit strategies 
 
(www.nvca.org). Decisions related to starting a new high-technology venture or investing in 
such a venture are made under conditions of technology and market uncertainty. In the early 
stages of the rollout of a new technology, the possible outcomes of such decisions and the 
probability of those outcomes are unknown (Alvarez and Barney, 2005), and market signals 
are not reliable (Coltman et al., 2001; OECD, 2001). One of the challenges for decision 
makers when an industry is not clearly established and lacks legitimacy is to develop relevant 
performance benchmarks (Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003). As a result, unrealistic expectations 
are set that could not be always met, as the burst of the dot.com bubble demonstrated.  
 
The present study is positioned within the new venture legitimacy literature. Following the 
call for further longitudinal, qualitative research in order to explore the legitimation process of 
new ventures (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002), as well as the call for exploring the survivability 
among international new ventures Zahra (2005), in this study, we are trying to further the 
understanding of how international new ventures went about acquiring their legitimacy by 
exploring rapid internationalisation of five small software companies during the dot.com 
bubble. Driven by the nature of the research question, we adopted a longitudinal multiple-case 
study methodology for the purpose of theory building. Five firms were selected on the basis 
of purposeful sampling logic from a homogeneous empirical context: they were small, 
software firms from Scotland that internationalised and struggled for survival between 1999 
and 2001. To explore these companies‟ critical events and episodes, the method of critical 
incident technique was employed. In total, twenty-three semi-structured in-depth interviews 
were conducted with company directors and their stakeholders, yielding approximately 150 
pages of transcribed notes. Emerging from this research data, a middle-range theory of new 
venture survivability is put forward to encourage, inter alia, a dynamic scholarly conversation 
and research on survival of new ventures.   
 
 
2. Theoretical background 
Liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965) and liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995) are the 
primary concerns of international new ventures in the early years of their existence (Zahra, 
2005). These uncertainties are compounded when industries these ventures operate in are in 
their formative years (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). In these contexts, both entrepreneurs and their 
financial backers have difficulties in understanding the nature of these new ventures, making 
realistic predictions about the markets growth potential, and learning and adjusting their 
 
behaviours as the industries emerge. As for example Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) maintain, 
the IT industry – in particular, software and dot.com companies – had been based 
significantly on legitimacy, not just hard economic analysis.  
 
Legitimacy is viewed as playing a key role in overcoming the above liabilities. For example, 
Stinchcombe (1965) describes legitimacy as an antidote for the liability of newness, whereas 
Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) view legitimacy as an important resource for gaining other 
resources. We define legitimacy as „a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of 
an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, believes, and definitions‟ (Suchman 1995, p. 574). Four strategies for acquiring 
legitimacy available to new ventures could be identified: conformance, selection, and 
manipulation (Suchman, 1995), and creation (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). Conformance 
involves seeking legitimacy by achieving conformity with the demands and expectations of 
the existing social structure in which the venture is currently positioned, i.e. it involves 
„following the rules‟. As argued by Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002), the new venture generally 
has little power and few resources to challenge the established social structure. Selection 
strategy allows the new venture to select a favourable geographic location where there are 
organisations that address similar rules, norms, values and models and may provide a new 
venture with legitimacy, e.g., software ventures locating in Silicon Valley or Silicon Glen.  
 
Manipulation strategy involves making changes in the environment to achieve consistency 
between the venture and its environment. Oliver describes manipulation as „the purposeful 
and opportunistic attempt to co-opt, influence, or control institutional pressures and 
evaluations‟ (1991, p. 157). For example, a new venture can manipulate its environment by 
teaming with successful, well-established organisations (e.g., Das and He, 2006; Rao et al., 
2008; Stuart et al., 1999). Creation strategy involves creating new operating practices, 
models, and ideas. According to Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002), this strategy especially is 
evident during the introductory stage of new industries and is most strategic of the above 
strategies. 
 
As Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) further maintain, the research on the topic of new venture 
legitimacy is in its infancy. Several recent empirical studies are trying to address this early 
criticism (e.g., Andries and Debackere, 2007; Bitektine, 2008; Delmar and Shane 2004; Rao 
et al., 2008; Sanders and Boivie, 2004; Zott and Huy, 2007). Delmar and Shane (2004) argue 
 
that legitimacy enhances the ability of founders to create social ties with external stakeholders 
and initiate routines to transfer resources. They analysed life stories of 223 new ventures and 
found that undertaking activities to generate legitimacy both enhance new venture survival 
and facilitate transition to other form of organising activities.  
 
Sanders and Boivie (2004) studied publicly traded US Internet firms and found that firm 
market valuation was strongly associated with corporate governance characteristics, e.g. board 
structure and venture capital participation. Rao et al. (2008) examined the stock market gains 
of all products introduced between 1982 and 2002 by all public firms in the US biotechnology 
industry and found that new ventures that acquired legitimacy externally by forming alliances 
with established firms gained more from their new products than new ventures that did not 
form such alliances. Andries and Debackere (2007) investigated the relationship between 
adaptation and performance on a sample of 117 independent new ventures and business units 
and found that adaptation is beneficial in less mature, capital-intensive and high-velocity 
industries but not so in more mature, stable industries.  
 
Zott and Huy (2007) explored which symbolic actions entrepreneurs performed in order to 
attract resources and when and why these actions are effective in acquiring resources. They 
identified four symbolic action categories that facilitate the resource acquisition: conveying 
entrepreneur‟s personal credibility, professional organising, organisational achievement, and 
quality of stakeholder relationships. Bitektine (2008) explored strategies that well-established 
organisations use to build legitimacy-based barriers to entry into their domain, and developed 
a typology of legitimacy manipulation strategies: change relative importance of legitimacy 
dimensions, and ultimately achieve legitimacy threshold „…below which the new venture 
struggles for existence and probably will perish and above which the new venture can achieve 
further gains in legitimacy and resources‟ (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002, p.427). In other 
words, there is a chance for a new venture to survive and grow should it reach the legitimacy 
threshold. 
 
The present study is in response to the call for further longitudinal, qualitative research in 
order to explore the legitimation process of new ventures (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002), as 
well as the call for exploring the survivability among international new ventures (Zahra, 
2005). Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) call for further longitudinal, qualitative research in order 
to explore various types of legitimacy and document the legitimation process by focusing on a 
 
single or small group of new ventures (p. 429). According to Zimmerman and Zeitz, the 
understanding of legitimation process in new ventures could be advanced, inter alia, by 
examining the effects of sources of legitimacy on resource acquisition, the sequence in which 
the sources of legitimacy are acquired, and the conditions under which the legitimacy 
strategies are most effective.  
 
The present study is also in response to a call for future research to advance the theory of 
international new ventures put forward by Zahra (2005). According to Zahra, little is known 
about the survivability among international new ventures, and how and why these ventures 
change their strategic direction. Zahra (2005) further maintains that „it is important to 
investigate the conditions that encourage international new ventures to [change], and to 
document the consequences of these changes for their survival and financial performance‟ 
(p.23). In the same vein, Aldrich and Fiol (1994) suggest that ventures that straggled and did 
not succeed in becoming legitimized provide the best evidence for testing the context of 
industry formation, as well as of new venture emergence. 
 
Several recent papers are trying to fill in this gap (Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson, 2009; 
Mudambi and Zahra, 2007; Sapienza et al., 2006). For example, Sapienza et al. (2006) in their 
conceptual paper distinguish between growth and survival as outcomes of INVs. These 
authors further posit that early internationalisation threatens firm survival due to the lack of 
necessary capabilities and positional advantages. Mudambi and Zahra (2007) compared the 
performance of new ventures that adopt international new venture mode of entry into foreign 
market with those that follow a sequential approach to internationalisation. In contrast to 
Sapienza et al.„s (2006) theorising, Mudambi and Zahra found that an INV strategy to 
internationalisation is no more likely to fail than a sequential approach to internationalisation. 
Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson (2009) explored in depth the survival and failure among five 
Finish software international new ventures. These authors found that dynamic capabilities are 
more critical to the survival of INVs than the amount of resources they possess.  
 
In spite of the above attempts, the research on survivability among international new ventures 
is in its infancy. In the present study, following the above research calls we are trying to 
further our understanding of how international new ventures go about acquiring their 
legitimacy by exploring rapid internationalisation of five small software companies during the 
dot.com bubble. 
 
 
 
3. Research methodology 
Driven by the nature of the research question, that is, to explore in-depth how international 
new ventures acquire legitimacy and survive, a multiple-case study strategy was adopted for 
the purpose of theory building (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). A qualitative inquiry such as 
the present study relies on purposeful sampling, the logic and power of which lie in selecting 
information-rich cases for study in depth (Eisenhardt, 1989). At the outset of our research 
quest, we were aware of the challenges that lay ahead in terms of gaining access to failed 
companies and collecting reliable and valid data. One of the challenges when studying this 
kind of companies is to minimize the attribution errors, i.e. when people tend to misattribute 
the cause of the events (Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003). According to Lovallo and Kahneman 
(2003), the typical pattern of such attribution errors is for people to take credit for positive 
outcomes and to attribute negative outcomes to external factors, no matter what their true 
cause is. 
 
Minimizing the effect of such attribution errors contributes to the enhancement of the 
construct validly of the research. Hence, the study was confined to a homogeneous empirical 
context. Several case study strategies were employed to develop sampling selection criteria. 
One strategy was to control for the effect of the competitive and remote environment on 
selected cases, like for example, legislation, market size, market structure across industries 
and countries, and effect of time. The other strategy was to control for the potential effect of 
resource bias; small being defined as a company having less than 100 employees (Storey, 
1994). And the third was to ensure that critical events were transparently observable in all 
cases, e.g., rapid internationalisation, and struggle for survival. Data triangulation also helped 
minimize the attribution errors by corroborating the data collected from entrepreneurs with 
the data collected from their stakeholders and other sources (Denzin, 1970). Five case 
companies were purposefully selected on the above identified criteria. The case companies 
were small, were operating in software sector in Scotland, internationalised, survived or 
ceased trading during 1999-2001.
1
 Table 1 provides a brief summary of the cases. For 
                                                 
1
 As one of recent crises that occurred during 1999-2003, dot.com bubble is of greater interest due to its facets. 
During that period one could witness hyper growth of the information and communication technology sector 
whose overall revenue growth peaked in 2000, then rapidly declined over the following year with the bursting of 
the dot.com bubble, and afterward remained essentially flat until 2003 (Coltman et al., 2001). 
 
confidentiality reasons, interviewees‟ and companies‟ names are disguised throughout the 
paper. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Data were collected from three sources: secondary sources, in-depth interviews with 
companies‟ CEOs, and companies‟ stakeholders, e.g. VCs, public policy advisors, strategy 
advisors, liquidators, and business correspondents, in four phases: from 2000 through 2003. 
To enhance the reliability of the research, databases were created for each case to organize 
and document data collected. Table 2 identifies the respondents who took part in this 
longitudinal study, as well as the association a particular stakeholder had with the case study 
companies. 
 
As decisions about internationalisation were fairly recent at the time of data collection, the 
critical incident technique (CIT) seemed appropriate to collect and analyse the data (Chell, 
1998; Flanagan, 1954). Chell defined CIT as a „…qualitative interview procedure that 
facilitates the investigation of significant occurrences (events, incidents, processes or issues) 
identified by respondent, the way they are managed, and the outcomes in terms of perceived 
effects‟ (1998, p. 56). For an incident to be critical, it has to deviate significantly, either 
positively or negatively, from what is normal or expected (Edvardsson, 1992). An interview 
guide was designed to ensure some comparativeness between the responses, and allow 
sufficient control over the interview to ensure that the research objectives were met. The 
average interview lasted approximately sixty minutes. All interviews were recorded with 
interviewee‟s permission, and transcribed verbatim immediately after. The write-ups of the 
cases were sent to respective interviewees for feedback and comments, thus contributing to 
the construct validity of the research. Twenty-three interviews were conducted, including 
follow-ups, yielding approximately 150 pages of interview data. As the research unfolded, 
primary data were added to the databases as well. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
An important feature of qualitative research is that there is significant overlap between the 
data collection and analysis phases (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser, 1978). The first step in the data 
analysis process according to CIT is to describe the incidents (Flanagan, 1954). According to 
 
Dubin (1978), the very essence of description is to name the properties of things, and the 
more adequate the description, the greater the likelihood that the concepts derived from the 
description will be useful in subsequent theory building. The interviews were transcribed and 
transferred, along with initial database pertinent to each case, to QSR NVivo program that 
handles qualitative data analysis research projects. The exploration and description of each 
case was centred on critical events and started from the inception of the company. Quotes 
from interviews were used extensively to illustrate the events, incidents, processes and issues 
that had, to various degrees, an impact on the process of legitimisation.  
 
The second step in the data analysis as per CIT is to choose a frame of reference so that it 
makes easier and more accurately to classify and analyze the data. Initially, the locale of 
events (Miles and Huberman, 1994) was identified, namely the entrepreneur, firm, home 
market, and international market levels. Then, four distinct time periods were identified that 
helped mapping the chronological flow of critical events, namely the emergence of new 
international business idea, international expansion, at a critical juncture, and beyond it. The 
above frames were structured in NVivo around the event listing matrix format that allowed a 
good look at what led to what, when and why (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
 
Third step in the data analysis is the category formulation, which represents an induction of 
categories from the basic data in the form of incidents (Flanagan, 1954). Within-case analysis 
was the basis for developing early constructs surrounding the critical events in the process of 
legitimation, and subsequent survival decisions, like for example hype. The content of the 
event listing matrix emerged after the initial „free coding‟ or open coding (Glaser, 1978) for 
each case was completed, and each case was explored and described in detail using the event 
listing matrix (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  
 
The last step in data analysis according to CIT is to determine the most appropriate level of 
specificity-generality to use in reporting the data. In this study, middle-range theorizing 
helped manage the complexity of the emergent legitimation process. According to Weick 
(1989, p. 521), middle-range theories are solutions to problems that contain a limited number 
of assumptions and considerable accuracy and detail in the problem specification. The 
iteration between emerging constructs, theory and data led to the emergence of the middle-
range theory of international new venture survivability that postulates that the closer the new 
 
venture is to the hype, the higher the likelihood of failure. The key elements of this emergent 
theory are discussed next.  
 
 
4. Toward a theory of international new venture survivability 
Empirical findings 
A complete theory must contain four essential elements (Dubin, 1978). The first element is 
what: what factors (variables, constructs) logically should be considered as part of the 
explanation of the social or individual phenomena of interest (Whetten, 1989)? According to 
Whetten, there are two criteria for judging the extent to which the „right‟ factors have been 
included: comprehensiveness (are all relevant factors included?) and parsimony (should some 
factors be deleted because they add little additional value to our understanding?).
2
 The key 
constructs considered by the proposed theory of new business venture survivability are new 
venture and hype. They emerged from the data during the coding process moving from open 
coding towards selective coding. 
 
By new venture we mean an innovation, new product, new technology, or new business idea. 
It is also pivotal to differentiate between new ventures that emerge within an institutionalized 
context and those that emerge within industries characterized by technical and market 
uncertainties, as well as goal ambiguity. The international new ventures studied in this paper 
refer to the latter type. In an uncertain environment, the probability distribution of outcomes 
yet to be created by exploiting a new venture is unknown (Alvarez and Barney 2005). In such 
an environment, different actors may make different choices with respect to the same 
technology, resulting in different outcomes (Carlaw et al., 2006).  
 
Grounded in data, hype is defined as the overall sentiment of the environmental context, 
within which the firm is embedded, about the future. The method of constructing typologies 
by reduction (Glaser, 1978) was employed to advance the typology of hype. By cross-
tabulating the sentiment of the competitive (industry growth) and remote (economic growth) 
environments about the future, the typology of hype was generated (Figure 1): (i) delusional 
optimism; (ii) over-optimism; (iii) pessimism; and (iv) realism talk. The growth outlook in 
                                                 
2
 The principle of parsimony that came to be known as Ockham‟s Razor was postulated by English philosopher 
William of Ockham. According to Ockham, it is pointless to do with more what can be done with less – frustra 
fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora – (Kemerling, 2002). 
 
each environment is labelled as positive signals (+) and negative signals (-). The emergent 
typology of hype is based on two key assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed that signals from the 
competitive environment will have a stronger effect on firms‟ behaviour/forecasts 
(represented as wavy lines in each quadrant). Secondly, the overall outcome arises as a result 
of the interaction between individuals and the changes in behaviour which they induce in one 
another (Ormerod, 1998).  
 
When the overall sentiment of the environmental context, within which the firm is embedded, 
about the future is positive (quadrants I and II, Figure 1), entrepreneurs, being influenced by 
other people‟s positive behaviour, will tend to hype, and be overoptimistic about the 
outcomes of their new ventures. In contrast to the above, an overall negative sentiment of the 
environment about the future (quadrant III, Figure 1) would lead to the opposite effect, i.e. to 
scepticism or pessimism. One might expect more realism when the sentiments about the 
future that emanate from competitive or remote environments have opposite signals (quadrant 
IV, Figure 1). For example, the OECD (2001) report demonstrated that a slowdown in the 
economy of the United States instilled a sense of realism into the debate, as well as putting an 
end to some exuberant economic behaviour. In this respect, Gabrielsson and Pelkonen (2008) 
also found that the cyclical nature of remote and competitive environments had a large impact 
on the international strategies of international new ventures that internationalized during 
1990-2003. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
The data also points to external and internal pressures as factors which lead to hyping 
behaviour in both business and investment communities. Derived from literature, for the 
purpose of the present study, hype is divided into two types: hyperbole (Coltman et al., 2001) 
and vapourware (Bayus et al., 2001; Haan, 2003). Hyperbole refers to a signal emanating 
from either competitive or remote environments about exaggerated future prospects of a 
technology, an innovation, a market, or a product. For example, Coltman et al. (2001) looked 
at visionary predictions of the e-business, like brands will die, prices will fall, and middlemen 
will die. The futuristic predictions that affected the interviewed companies were driven by 
prospects of the introduction of 3G mobile phones, adoption of smart cards, internet banking 
and data mining, to name a few: for instance, bank branches will disappear, third generation 
mobile phones will replace home computers, etc. For example: 
 
‘What was common to all our solutions was that people were using the Internet more 
and more in Finance as the way of communicating more cost-effectively with the 
customers. At that point there was even an idea to get rid of all branches; it will be all 
internet banking. But we found out that branch network was still an important part. So 
we were looking at where the common features of the systems we had built for insurers 
and some banks so that we can build a product round that. …it happened that our 
product was too immature at that point’ – the CEO of Finance-Software. 
 
Vapourware is a signal emanated by companies to the market and refers to a false 
announcement of a new product in an attempt to deter entry (Haan, 2003). In the US 
vapourware even became an antitrust concern (for review see Levy 1997). The vapourware 
construct emerged as a recurrent theme throughout the analysis of cross-case data, and it was 
originated by one and the same company, which happened to be one of the largest software 
companies in the world. Four companies from the sample suffered to various degrees from 
this vapourware. The entrepreneurs who had experienced the vapourware stemmed from this 
large organisation described it as being just a “marketing hype”, “lot of clouds”, “spooking” 
and “bandits”: 
‘For a moment we thought maybe we could work with [this company] to the extent that 
[it] tends to go so far up in the enterprise. But it did not work, because [it] could not do 
the big systems. They just did not have the technology. Subsequently they introduced a 
technology called […], which meant to be kind of whole enterprise wide technology 
…marketing hype really’ – the CEO of Finance-Software; 
‘One of the things you learn about the technology markets is that the big [enterprise] 
players spin awfully a lot about what is possible, and raise customer expectations. 
However, they consistently failed to deliver, and the markets became very sceptical. As 
a result, it became very difficult for someone who could actually deliver, to come along 
and penetrate the major market share. These companies put a lot of clouds, smoke, and 
actually prevent small businesses getting into the markets most of the time’ – the CEO 
of Mobile-Software; 
‘One of the big factor that led to a decision to [de-institutionalise] was that [our 
strategic partner], continuing the development of the market place, started talking 
about the sorts of things that we were doing in their database product. This would have 
overlapped with what we did, and clearly would have killed the company. This intention 
spooked a lot of people, and the perception by some was that that was going to happen 
 
sooner than later. In the company we held the impression that if we continue with the 
same strategy, then [our partner] will take away our business at the end. It actually 
turned out that they still have not included that functionality and have not released the 
database they were talking about back in 2000. These companies announce a lot of 
products they intend to develop which they never do, and they do this only to influence 
the market’ – the CEO of Data-Software; 
‘Our trouble started in early 2000 with couple of events… with [our strategic partner] 
leaving who scrapped the smart card market and owed us money. We had a lot of good 
customers, apart from this company, who were bunch of bandits; seriously bad 
company’ – the CEO of Tool-Software. 
 
The above emerged constructs, new venture and hype, attempt to explain the evolution of 
start-up firms or new ventures in established firms that decide to pursue new market 
opportunities in uncertain decision making situations where predictions, especially about net 
present value, are unreliable (Alvarez and Barney, 2005; Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003). As 
one venture capitalist explained: 
‘If you go back three years now, the market was extremely bullish, and investors were 
willing to take very large risks, and also had an inflated idea of what companies might 
be worth. The big thing that we’ve been working on quite hard to improve for the last 
five years I guess was to get real views on the size and trends of the markets’ – the 
venture capitalist. 
 
The second element of a theory is how: how the identified factors are related? By answering 
this question the researcher adds order to the conceptualisation by explicitly delineating 
patterns, and typically introduces causality (Whetten, 1989). According to Whetten (1989), 
together the what and how elements constitute the domain or subject of the theory. The data in 
this study suggest that hype moderates the emergence (discovery and exploitation) of a new 
venture. That is, the proximity to the hype reflects the degree of embeddedness of the firm 
within its environmental context. As the typology of hype suggests, when new business 
ventures are pursued or new demands are created in uncertain decision making situations, 
entrepreneurs will be prone to hype their business plans as there will be virtually no risk of 
being detected of such behaviour. As the company CEOs maintained:  
‘We had to construct the business plan so that it would give VCs the rates of return to 
buy them into. So, we had to construct something that would say that we could do it for 
 
£9 million, although we needed £18 million. In the end we received £6 million 
only…and all this backfired. At the board meeting we raised the issue whether our 
ambitious plans should be cut in line with the reduced funds, to which investors said 
that the plan should be executed as stated in the business plan’ – the CEO of Mobile-
Software; 
‘Our initial business plan was more realistic. The revised one was a bit ambitious, not 
to say the least, was the reality of it. But you have to pitch in that fashion in order to 
secure any investment at all. You have to be very positive about what you can do. 
Admittedly, you should not exaggerate, but you should not underplay either. And the 
projections you have to put in place in order to get investment, especially back in those 
days, were expected to be quite ambitious’ – the CEO of Project-Software. 
 
The third element of a theory relates to why: what the underlying psychological, economic, or 
social dynamics are that justify the selection of factors and the proposed causal relationships 
(Whetten, 1989). According to Whetten (1989), the above are the theory‟s assumptions. From 
an economic perspective, this study argues that hype and uncertainty are two sides of the 
same coin. Under uncertainty, according to Knight (1921), there is „no valid basis of any kind 
for classifying instances to determine probability from past experience or statistical 
calculation‟ (p. 225). This is especially true when entrepreneurs are opening new markets or 
exploiting new technologies (Schumpeter 1934). When these kinds of entries are undertaken, 
the cash flow an entry is expected to generate (the mean of the distribution) and the rate at 
which the cash flow should be discounted over time (the variance of the distribution) are not 
known (Alvarez and Barney, 2005). In other words, net present value cannot be calculated 
under Knightian uncertainty. As one liquidator observed: 
‘When I look at forecasts in the business plan that were used to get the initial funding I 
can say straight away: this is absolutely ridiculous; there is no way the company could 
grow at that pace. The whole thrust of a young technology business is to hype, if you 
like, to create large expectations about sales, and profit levels’ – the liquidator. 
 
From a psychological perspective, decision-makers‟ over-optimism can be traced both to 
cognitive biases and to organisational pressures (Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003). According to 
Lovallo and Kahneman (2003), the most prevalent of cognitive biases is anchoring. This is 
when, for example, the initial business plan accentuates the positive, and the subsequent 
analysis will be skewed towards over-optimism. Under organisational pressures, when 
 
forecasts are critical in attracting funding, decision makers have big incentives to accentuate 
the positive and downplay the negative in laying out prospective outcomes. Lovallo and 
Kahneman (2003) further argue that this raises the odds that the projects chosen for 
investment will be those with the most overoptimistic forecasts – and hence the highest 
probability of disappointment. As one liquidator explained: 
‘It is the hype that generates VCs’ money. When the things are not progressing quite as 
quickly as they wanted, in my experience, there tends not to be a lot of realism talk; 
there tends to be even more hype. Because usually what’s happening is that suddenly 
they need more money than they thought. And the last thing they are going to do is to 
actually talk the situation down, and hype it a bit further’ – the liquidator. 
 
From a social perspective, it is maintained that the overall behaviour of individuals in a given 
setting depends on the interaction between individuals and the changes in behaviour which 
they induce in one another (Ormerod, 1998). According to Ormerod, positive feedback that 
generally rules the real world of the economy and society will lead to trends being reinforced 
rather than reversed. As the typology of hype suggests, when the overall sentiment of the 
environmental context about the future is positive, entrepreneurs, being influenced by other 
people‟s positive behaviour, will tend to hype and be overoptimistic about the outcomes of 
their ventures. Furthermore, entrepreneurs will find it financially advantageous, and often 
unavoidable, to fall in with the ideas of the market, even though they themselves are better 
instructed (Keynes, 1936). This self-reinforcing mechanism that creates hype, also leads to 
the creation of fashion. As the data suggest these two variables control each other in a loop. 
As one business strategy consultant noted: 
‘Hype is important as it creates fashion. At the same time, hype is driven by fashion. If 
you like, they are the two sides of the same coin. Hype releases the investment 
decisions, because it reduces the pain of failure, whereas human psychology of failure 
is ameliorated by fashion’ – the business strategy consultant.  
 
According to Keynes (1936), worldly wisdom teaches that it is far better for reputation to fail 
conventionally than to succeed unconventionally. That is, there are high emotional and 
professional costs associated with being the odd one out, as one business strategy consultant 
observed:  
‘It is not nearly so bad being killed on the first day of the Somme with twenty thousand 
other people than it is being killed on your own in no man’s land because you went out 
 
and stood up. The former is a glorious failure; the second is just an idiot thing to do. 
What happens in a hype driven market, people are making decisions because everybody 
else is doing it. The hype and fashion protect you from being one man odd out. If you 
feel in your heart and gut that this is all rubbish, but you still do it, because it is 
fashionable and hyped’ – the business strategy consultant. 
 
The last, but not least, element of a theory relates to who, where, when: these are temporal and 
contextual factors, which set the boundaries of generalizability, and as such constitute the 
range of the theory (Whetten, 1989). The context of the theory of new venture survivability is 
the process of emergence of a new venture in uncertain decision making situations. The 
process of emergence relates to the processes of discovery and exploitation of a new business 
venture (Davidsson, 2003). A new business venture can emerge as a start-up or in an 
established firm. Uncertainty is the effect of the process of emergence of new ventures, e.g. 
when entrepreneurs create new markets or exploit new technologies (Schumpeter, 1934).  
 
With regard to temporal boundaries of the theory of new venture survivability, the theoretical 
effects of hype vary over time. That is, hype is unstable. As companies move away from hype 
towards risk decision making settings, more accurate information would come from the 
market that would make it possible to perform much needed statistical calculations, and 
therefore to make a distinction between hype and reality. That is, as the history of a new 
market or a new technology is being formed, the behaviour of various stakeholders will 
change accordingly. 
 
The emergent theory 
According to Dubin (1978, p.96), „empirically relevant theory in the behavioural and social 
sciences is built upon the acceptance of the notion of relationship rather than of the notion of 
causality‟. This does not mean that causality (or prediction) is of secondary or lower 
importance. It means a social and behavioural scientist employ a theory building strategy 
firstly aimed at improving understanding before seeking to improve prediction. In what 
follows, the units of the emergent theory, the law(s) of interaction that connects them, as well 
as the boundaries of the emergent theory and its system states will be discussed.  
 
The units of the emergent theory are new venture and hype. These are latent or summative 
units that „...draw together a number of different properties of a thing and highlight one of the 
 
most important‟ (Dubin 1978, p. 66). For example, INV is not just a new venture that 
internationalizes right from inception a new technology, but also is a new venture that seeks to 
acquire for example market, location, operational, and alliance legitimacies, as well as to 
establish a strategic posture for the first time (Nicholls-Nixon et al., 2000) in order to mitigate 
the liability of newness and foreignness, and eventually rich a legitimacy threshold. The unit 
hype is seen as a signal in the form of hyperbole or vapourware as well as a delusional 
optimism or over-optimism over a certain event driven by uncertainty and shared/collective 
expectations.  
 
The law of interaction connects the units of the theory, and itself is never measured (Dubin, 
1978). In the present emergent theory closer and higher the likelihood is the connecting 
phrase. Degree of closeness could be seen through the lens of embeddedness, i.e., proximity 
to the hype reflects the degree of embeddedness of the firm within its environmental context. 
Embeddedness could be viewed as the on-going contextualization of economic exchange in 
social structures (Granovetter, 1985), creating economic value through three mechanisms: 
trust, fine-grained information transfer, and joint problem solving Uzzi (1996). Uzzi (1999) 
sees the synergy created from these mechanisms as „unanimity of inference‟ (p. 488) that 
creates shared/collective expectations. Through embeddedness one may also explore at 
another level for example how a nation and sector context shapes the spread of norms and 
values and the receipt of innovation (Dacin et al., 1999; Krippner and Alvarez, 2007).  
 
The boundary of the theory is determined when the limiting values on the units comprising 
the theory are known (Dubin, 1978). Further, the boundary of the theory delineates its domain 
as being „...the territory over which we can make truth statements about the model and, 
therefore, about the values of the units composing the model‟ (Dubin, 1978, p. 134). For 
example, determinate limiting values of the international new venture unit are 
internationalisation gap, newness, foreignness, and knowledge intensity. As to the hype, the 
limiting values are technical uncertainty, market uncertainty, goal ambiguity, delusional 
optimism and over-optimism. In our process of theorising we turned to middle-range theories 
that are seen as models characterised by not too few, but at the same time not too many 
boundary-determining criteria (Dubin, 1978; Merton, 1957).  
 
Before the state of the system is discussed, it is pivotal to address the notion of paradox in 
theory building. Dubin distinguishes between precision paradox and power paradox. Precision 
 
paradox states that „it is possible to achieve high precision in predicting when changes in 
system states will occur and what states will succeed each other, without possessing 
knowledge of how the system operates‟ (Dubin, 1978; p. 25; original emphasis). The power 
paradox deals with the question of creating models that „...are powerful in contributing to 
understanding, without providing, at the same time, precision in prediction‟ (Dubin, 1978, p. 
26).  
 
In dealing with the precision paradox we turned to logical simplifications (Dubin, 1978) or 
coding families (Glaser, 1978) that are widely used in sociology to predict the change from 
one state to another, like for example uncertainty and risk, uncertain decision-making settings 
and risk decision-making settings,
3
 or new and established. As asserted earlier, as the history 
of a new market or a new technology is being formed, the stakeholders involved become more 
knowledgeable about the new technology or new market in question, and therefore can make 
more accurate predictions about their potential. That is, the state of the system moves from 
uncertain decision-making settings towards risk-decision making settings. In dealing with the 
power paradox, we were aware of the fact that by excluding crucial variables from the theory 
(e.g., degree of knowledge intensity, size, mode of start-up, board composition, presence of 
venture capital, to name a few) that may contribute significantly to an outcome, we have not 
limited the power of understanding of the operation of this system. As argued by Dubin 
(1978), oversimplification of a phenomenon contributes to a better understanding of the 
phenomenon, but it can not directly generate precise predictions. On the basis of the above, 
the following section sets the stage for the discussion and presentations of the propositions 
that are truth statements about a theory (Dubin, 1978), rather than development of hypothesis.  
 
 
5. Discussion and future research directions  
With this study we aim to contribute to the research on new venture legitimacy by exploring 
in-depth the legitimation process of new small high technology ventures that rapidly 
internationalised and struggled for survival during the dot.com bubble. Our study is 
                                                 
3
 A risk decision making situation is similar to a rolling a traditional die, that is balanced and fair. In other 
words, it is possible to calculate the probability of the outcomes. Uncertain decision making situation 
resembles a rolling a die with infinite number of sides, without knowing whether the die is balanced and fair. 
Under these circumstances, it is impossible to calculate the probability of the outcomes. For example, 
Zimmerman and Zeltz (2002) refer in their paper to „the unknown future‟ (p. 416) to define uncertainty. It 
looks like a tautology; however, what they probably refer to is an uncertain decision making situation. 
 
 
positioned within the new venture legitimacy literature as it centres on entrepreneurial actions 
directed to acquire legitimacy for their newly established ventures during the early stages of 
industry emergence and quick decline. We explored how owners of five small software firms, 
selected from a homogeneous empirical context, went about acquiring legitimacy for their 
ventures in an attempt to internationalise and survive before and after the dot.com bubble. 
 
Grounded in data, we advance a middle range theory of international new venture 
survivability that maintains that proximity to the hype reflects the degree of embeddedness of 
the firm within its environmental context. We view hype and uncertainty as two sides of the 
same coin. When signals about the market and technology are not reliable, or uncertain, 
entrepreneurs are prone to hype their business plans as there will be virtually no risk of such 
behaviour being detected. Under organisational pressures, when forecasts are critical in 
attracting funding, entrepreneurs have strong incentives to accentuate the positive and 
downplay the negative in laying out prospective outcomes, thus increasing the likelihood of 
failure. At the level of middle-range theorising, we infer that the closer the new venture is to 
the hype, the higher the likelihood of failure. As companies move away from hype towards 
risk decision making settings with more realism, more accurate information comes from the 
market. This makes it possible to perform much needed statistical calculations, and therefore 
to make a distinction between hype and reality.  
 
The advancement of the middle range theory of international new venture survivability has 
several implications for the theory of new venture legitimacy. Our findings suggest that the 
new venture legitimation process depends on the nature of the venture and of the environment 
it operates in. The data suggest that the key to understanding the process of legitimation is the 
„newness‟ of a venture and its respective market. In this we concur with Tornikoski and 
Newbert (2007) that the process of new venture emergence can be understood and predicted 
by viewing it as a quest for legitimacy. At the same time, the extent of newness allows 
differentiating between uncertain and risk decision making situations. For example, from the 
point of view of the creation of new economic activity (Kirzner, 1997), as a minimum, a new 
or established firm may introduce what internally is a new activity and what appears at the 
same time as a new imitator in a market (Davidsson, 2005). At the high end of the continuum 
of new economic activity creation, there might be the global introduction of radical 
innovation (Schumpeter, 1934). In this case we side with DiMaggio and Powell (1983) who 
 
maintain that modelling on others‟ behaviour is a response to technical and market 
uncertainty.  
 
From the legitimation strategies point of view, the middle range theory of international new 
venture survivability supports Zimmerman and Zeitz‟s (2002) assertion that manipulation 
may be employed strategically by new ventures to acquire legitimacy, and eventually reach a 
legitimacy threshold. At the same time, it suggests, in contrary to Zimmerman and Zeitz 
(2002) that this manipulation strategy is not that difficult for new ventures to pursue. As the 
data suggest, in an uncertain decision making situation entrepreneurs will prone to anchor 
(Lovallo and Kahneman, 2003) and subsequently hype their business plans to acquire for 
example venture capital. In the same vain, Rutherford et al. (2009) argue that entrepreneurs in 
the attempt to attain legitimacy threshold may tell „legitimacy lies that are intentional 
misrepresentations of the facts‟ (p. 950). As to the selection strategy, the data suggest that in 
VC backed firms, entrepreneurs might have no say over the selection of the environment in 
which their business shall operate. For example, entrepreneurs, driven by the intimate 
knowledge of the innovation, may want to grow gradually, whereas VCs, driven by the 
investment cycle of their investment portfolio, will insist on rapid internationalisation. As 
regards the creation strategy, it maybe assumed that it involves what DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983, p. 149) call „managerial behaviour at the level of taken-for-granted behaviour‟ since 
the introduction of a new technology in an emerging market will imply a creation of new 
rules, regulations, and standards. Hence the following proposition: 
 
P1: In an uncertain decision making situation, entrepreneurs will regard the manipulation 
strategy as the key strategic choice to acquire legitimacy. 
 
P2.  In an uncertain decision making situation, manipulation strategy will have the highest 
impact on the process of legitimation. 
 
As to the type of legitimacy sought by the new ventures in an uncertain decision making 
situations, we side with Scott (1995) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983) that the acquisition of 
regulatory and normative legitimacy is a taken-for-granted assumption rather than a conscious 
strategic choice. Therefore we posit that: 
 
 
P3. In an uncertain decision making situation, entrepreneurs will pursue the manipulation 
strategy to acquire cognitive legitimacy. 
 
Our study also makes an attempt to understand the nature of a legitimacy threshold put 
forward by (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). Although Zimmerman and Zeitz maintain that 
„what constitutes a threshold is difficult to identify and probably unique to each new venture‟ 
(p. 428), they challenge researchers to delve into the nature of the legitimacy threshold by 
asking whether it is a continuous variable or a dichotomous phenomenon. The data in the 
study points to the continuous nature of the legitimacy threshold and suggest that it may be 
defined by the time when the emergent industry moves away from hype towards risk decision 
making settings, more realism talk or event pessimism. In this situation a new venture can no 
longer defend their status quo by pursuing the manipulation strategy as the history of a new 
market or an innovation is being formed, allowing for much needed statistical calculations to 
be performed. In this context, this legitimacy threshold could be viewed as a cutting point of 
the closure of the window of opportunity during which new ventures would be free to pursue 
the manipulation strategy without being detected. The following proposition then follows:   
 
P4. The extent of the manipulation strategy will depend on the embeddedness of new venture 
in its hyped environment; closer to the hype, higher the extent of manipulation strategy.  
 
The above proposition generates a legitimacy threshold paradox. According to Lovallo and 
Kahneman (2003), new ventures that anchor their business plans raise the odds of receiving 
necessary resources, but at the same time have the highest probability of failure. This would 
suggest that lesser the extent of the manipulation strategy increases the chances of survival. 
This may sound a plausible proposition, given the fact that entrepreneurs have an intimate 
knowledge about the potential of a technology and a market. However, as the data suggest, 
despite of the above knowledge, entrepreneurs in a hyped environment will be prone to follow 
the behaviour of others in the market.    
 
By advancing the middle range theory of international new venture survivability, we also aim 
to encourage a dynamic scholarly conversation and research on legitimacy and survival of 
international new ventures. For example, one may consider testing the theory in the current 
settings of global financial and economic crisis. In this case, an area of interest might be to 
study the social collective behaviour under conditions of uncertainty and the impact of such 
 
behaviour on entrepreneurship and small business, social marketing, public finance and public 
policy, and the society as a whole. In other words, can we use the middle range theory of 
international new venture survivability to reduce future impact of events like dot.com bubble 
and current housing bubble and financial crisis on the society? On one side of the equation 
there might be technical and market uncertainty related to the financial products, like 
sophisticated derivative instruments, developed over the years by bankers and the like, who 
themselves in turn were not able to understand them fully (www.parliament.co.uk). On the 
other, there might be identified constructs related to collective behaviour or group dynamics, 
derived from, but not limited to, sometime conflicting conjectures from wisdom of crowds 
(Surowiecki, 2004), butterfly economics (Ormerod, 1998), or shift to risk (Brown, 1965) 
behaviours.  
 
In the above emergent theory of international new venture survivability, we side with 
Mathews and Zander (2007, p. 399), that the early growth and experiences of any firm 
becoming engaged in the global economy can best be accommodated in a theoretical 
framework that is open to an appreciation of internationalisation as a process of 
entrepreneurial discovery, strategising under genuine uncertainty rather than economising, 
and dynamic processes of exploitation, redeployment of resources and learning. 
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Table 1. Summary of case companies 
 Finance 
Software 
Project 
Software 
Tool    
Software 
Mobile 
Software 
Data    
Software 
Business 
description 
B2B platforms 
for financial 
service industry 
Tools to 
estimate project 
costs 
 
Tools to 
estimate and 
test smart cards 
Platform to 
integrate 
mobile 
workforce data 
to the HQ 
Data warehouse 
to convert data 
into 
information 
Founded 1996 
MBO 
1992 
Start-up 
1985 
Start-up 
2000 
Start-up 
1998 
Spin-out 
Emergence of 
INVI
1
 
1998 1995 1993 2000 1998 
Internationalized 1998 1997 1995 2000 1998 
Country entered US, Brazil US, Europe US, Europe UK, Europe, 
Middle East 
US 
Entry mode Exporting Exporting Exporting Acquisitions Sales 
subsidiaries 
De-
institutionalised
2
 
1999 
Focused on 
home market 
2001 
Ceased trading, 
re-
internationalised 
2000 
Changed 
strategic 
direction 
2002 
Ceased trading 
 
2001 
Ceased trading 
 
 
1
 INVI stands for international new venture idea; as shown in the table the emergence of INVI does not 
necessarily coincide with the emergence of the INV. 
 
2 
Deinstitutionalisation is defined „…as the process by which the legitimacy of an established or 
institutionalized organizational practices erodes or discontinues‟ (Oliver 1992, p. 564) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Process of data collection and triangulation 
 
Phase Interviewees
1
 Affiliation 
Phase 1  
Summer of 
2000 
 
Leader of internationalization team, 
Scottish Trade International 
 
Leader of software team, Scottish Trade 
International
 
 
 
 
Marketing Director of Finance-Software 
CEO of Project-Software 
Internationalization team at Scottish Trade 
International was assisting small and medium 
companies in their internationalization efforts 
Software team at Scottish Trade International 
focused on coordinating the internationalization 
efforts of Scottish software firms 
 
Phase 2  
Autumn of 
2002 
 
Marketing Director of Finance-Software 
Leader of software team, Scottish Trade 
International
 
 
Leader of internationalization team, 
Scottish Trade International
 
 
 
Phase 3  
Beginning 
of 2003 
 
Business correspondent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leader of software team, Scottish Trade 
International 
Liquidator 
 
 
CEO of Project-Software 
Venture Capitalist 
 
 
Marketing Director of Finance-Software 
CEO of Tool-Software 
CEO of Mobile-Software 
CEO of Finance-Software 
CEO of Data-Software 
Board member of Scottish Enterprise 
This business correspondent was working for the 
„Business a.m.‟ newspaper and was responsible for 
tracking the evolution of nineteen „next generation‟ 
entrepreneurs who were involved in various high-
technology start-us. All these Cases were among 
those nineteen.  
 
 
 
This liquidator was appointed as a receiver to 
Project-Software  
 
 
This venture capitalist invested in Project-Software 
and Data-Software; rejected funding to Tool-
Software 
 
 
 
 
 
Scottish Enterprise is the Scotland‟s economic, 
enterprise, innovation and investment agency 
Phase 4  
End of 2003 
 
CEO of Finance-Software 
CEO of Project-Software 
Business strategy consultant
 
 
 
Liquidator 
CEO of Data-Software 
 
 
This business strategy consultant consulted Tool-
Software 
 
 
1
 Interviewees are listed in the order they were interviewed 
 
Figure 1. Typology of hype 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I
delusional optimism
III
pessimism
II
overoptimism
IV
realism talk
Sentiment about  
industry growth*
Sentiment about
economy growth
+
-+
-
* At the moment of creating new industry or new demand within an existing industry
